Mitsubishi MU-2B N310MA

Summary

On 7 April 1996 at about 16:55 local time, a Mitsubishi MU-2B registered N310MA, operated by Ronald C. Bingham, was involved in an accident near Batesville, Mississippi, United States. 2 people were on board and nobody was injured. The aircraft was substantially damaged. The NTSB has published a probable cause for this accident; it is quoted in full below.

Date

7 April 1996 at 16:55

Classification

Accident

Location

Batesville, Mississippi, United States

Nearest airport

Batesville (06M)

Coordinates

34.3105, -89.9305

Aircraft

Mitsubishi MU-2B

Registration

N310MA

Category

Airplane

Engines

2

Operator

Ronald C. Bingham

Operating rule

Part 91: General Aviation

Purpose of flight

Personal

Phase of flight

Not recorded

Route

Montgomery → Unknown

Aircraft damage

Substantial

Weather

VMC

Light

Day

NTSB number

ATL96LA078

Nobody was injured.

an anomaly in the fuel system that allowed a pressure differential to occur between the center and outer portions of the main integral fuel tank, which in turn resulted in fuel starvation of both engines. A factor relating to the accident was: failure of company maintenance personnel to remove fuel system vent check valves as recommended by Mitsubishi MU-2 Service Bulletin 130A.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record. This site does not paraphrase or interpret it.

Read the full NTSB narrative

The pilot reported that loss of power occurred in both engines after he entered the traffic pattern for a full stop landing. The airplane collided with trees during an emergency landing in a cotton field near the airport. Subsequent review of the aircraft maintenance logs disclosed that Mitsubishi MU-2 Service Bulletin (SB) 130A had not been accomplished on this airplane. According to the manufacturer, an inadvertent failure or the improper installation of a filler cap after refueling may cause an air pressure differential between the center and outboard portions of the main integral fuel tank. Air leakage from the filler cap may result in failure of the fuel transfer system to move fuel from the outboard tank section to the center tank section. To eliminate this possible malfunction, the operator was to remove vent check valves from the bulkhead between the tanks in accordance with SB 130A. The operator's maintenance policies required that, company jet and turbo propeller aircraft be maintained under a maintenance program in accordance with FAR Parts 135.415, 135.417, 135.423, 135.443, and a corporate flight management approved aircraft inspection program (AAIP). The maintenance inspection program also included compliance with manufacturers' service bulletins and service letters.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record.