Douglas DC-8-63F N827AX

Summary

On 22 December 1996 at about 23:10 local time, a Douglas DC-8-63F registered N827AX was involved in an accident near Narrows, Virginia, United States. 6 people were on board and 6 died. The aircraft was destroyed. The NTSB has published a probable cause for this accident; it is quoted in full below.

Date

22 December 1996 at 23:10

Classification

Accident

Location

Narrows, Virginia, United States

Coordinates

38.8902, -77.2997

Aircraft

Douglas DC-8-63F

Registration

N827AX

Category

Airplane

Engines

4

Operator

Not recorded

Operating rule

Part 91: General Aviation

Purpose of flight

Unknown

Phase of flight

Not recorded

Route

Greensboro → Unknown

Aircraft damage

Destroyed

Weather

IMC

Light

Night/Dark

NTSB number

DCA97MA016

6 people died.

the inappropriate control inputs applied by the flying pilot during a stall recovery attempt, the failure of the nonflying pilot-in-command to recognize, address, and correct these inappropriate control inputs, and the failure of ABX to establish a formal functional evaluation flight program that included adequate program guidelines, requirements and pilot training for performance of these flights. Contributing to the causes of the accident were the inoperative stick shaker stall warning system and the ABX DC-8 flight training simulator's inadequate fidelity in reproducing the airplane's stall characteristics. (NTSB Report AAR-97/05)

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record. This site does not paraphrase or interpret it.

Read the full NTSB narrative

The airplane impacted mountainous terrain while on a post-modification functional evaluation flight (FEF). The pilot flying (PF) had applied inappropriate control column back pressure during the clean stall maneuver recovery attempt in an inadequate performance of the stall recovery procedure established in ABX's (Airborne Express) operations manual. The pilot not flying (PNF), in the right seat, was serving as the pilot-in-command and was conducting instruction in FEF procedures. The PNF failed to recognize, address and correct the PF's inappropriate control inputs. An inoperative stall warning system failed to reinforce to the flightcrew the indications that the airplane was in a full stall during the recovery attempt. The flightcrew's exposure to a low fidelity reproduction of the DC-8's stall characteristics in the ABX DC-8 flight training simulator was a factor in the PF holding aft (stall-inducing) control column inputs when the airplane began to pitch down and roll. The accident could have been prevented if ABX had institutionalized and the flightcrew had used the revised FEF flight stall recovery procedure agreed upon by ABX in 1991. The informality of the ABX FEF training program permitted the inappropriate pairing of two pilots for an FEF, neither of whom had handled the flight controls during an actual stall in the DC-8.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record.