McDonnell Douglas DC-9-51 N601AP

Summary

On 9 February 1998 at about 19:47 local time, a McDonnell Douglas DC-9-51 registered N601AP, operated by Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., was involved in an incident near Honolulu, Hawaii, United States. 144 people were on board and nobody was injured. The aircraft was slightly damaged. The NTSB has published a probable cause for this accident; it is quoted in full below.

Date

9 February 1998 at 19:47

Classification

Incident

Location

Honolulu, Hawaii, United States

Nearest airport

Honolulu International (HNL)

Coordinates

21.3490, -157.8805

Aircraft

McDonnell Douglas DC-9-51

Registration

N601AP

Category

Airplane

Engines

2

Operator

Hawaiian Airlines, Inc.

Operating rule

Part 121: Air Carrier

Purpose of flight

Unknown

Phase of flight

Not recorded

Route

Unknown → Kona

Aircraft damage

Minor

Weather

VMC

Light

Day

NTSB number

LAX98IA085

Nobody was injured.

the disintegration of the No. 6 bearing in the No. 2 engine which resulted in an aborted takeoff. In addition, the malfunction of the slide in the right forward service door was the result of a faulty seal in the inflation system. The inflation gauge had not been checked that day due to confusion resulting from a change in the operations manual. The change in the language made it unclear as to whose responsibility it was to check the inflation gauge. The operator did not verify that the change was being properly implemented after it had been made effective.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record. This site does not paraphrase or interpret it.

Read the full NTSB narrative

During takeoff the crew heard a loud oscillating sound and aborted takeoff. The tower reported fire was visible from their right engine. The aircraft stopped and the crew initiated the engine fire and emergency evacuation check lists. The forward right service door was opened but the slide did not inflate. The airstairs were then deployed and the occupants deplaned. An inspection revealed an engine bearing cage had disintegrated. The evacuation slide was tested and functioned properly; however, its inflation bottle was found to be empty. While required, the bottle had not been checked that day because of a change in the operations manual that had resulted in confusion as to whose responsibility it was to perform the daily pressure checks. The manual states that it is the captain's responsibility to ensure that the bottle is pressurized but it is not an item on the preflight checklist. The flight crew thought maintenance personnel were performing the checks while maintenance personnel thought the crews were checking the bottles. The bottles have a history of sometimes losing pressure over time.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record.