Hiller UH-12E N5388V

Summary

On 2 November 1999 at about 19:18 local time, a Hiller UH-12E registered N5388V was involved in an accident near Stites, Idaho, United States. 3 people were on board and 2 were seriously injured. The aircraft was substantially damaged. The NTSB has published a probable cause for this accident; it is quoted in full below.

Date

2 November 1999 at 19:18

Classification

Accident

Location

Stites, Idaho, United States

Coordinates

46.0808, -115.9707

Aircraft

Hiller UH-12E

Registration

N5388V

Category

Helicopter

Engines

1

Operator

Not recorded

Operating rule

Public Use

Purpose of flight

Public Use

Phase of flight

Not recorded

Route

Clarkston → Grangeville

Aircraft damage

Substantial

Weather

Unk

Light

Day

NTSB number

SEA00TA013

2 people were seriously injured.

Inadequate inspection of the control rotor cuff by a company mechanic and subsequent fatigue fracture of the cuff, resulting in an inflight separation of the control rotor blade. Factors contributing to the accident were: inadequate quality control during manufacture; insufficiently defined manufacturer's inspection and repair procedures; inadequate FAA approval of the manufacturer's inspection and repair procedures; power lines in the helicopter's emergency descent flight path; and reduced aircraft controllability following the control rotor separation.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record. This site does not paraphrase or interpret it.

Read the full NTSB narrative

During a low-altitude fish survey, the helicopter experienced a separation of a control rotor while leveling off from a climb to about 400 feet above ground level (AGL). The pilot initiated an emergency descent but, due to severely reduced cyclic controllability resulting from the separation, was unable to avoid power lines in the aircraft's emergency descent flight path. The helicopter struck the power lines about 50 feet AGL and fell to the ground, landing hard but upright. Post-accident examination disclosed a fatigue failure in the cuff which retains the control rotor blade. The fatigue originated on two opposite sides of a retaining bolt hole that appeared to have been unevenly hand chamfered or deburred during original manufacture of the cuff, with gouging and sharp-bottomed dents visible at the origins. However, while a company mechanic had signed off an Airworthiness Directive (AD) requiring recurring inspection of the cuff about two months/56 flight hours before the accident, post-accident examination disclosed evidence indicative of inadequate inspection and maintenance of the assembly, including: old dried grease between the cuff and control rotor blade spar, large areas of the spar missing required paint with associated corrosion areas, and zinc chromate primer in corrosion pits. The FAA-approved Hiller service bulletin referenced by the AD contains procedures for inspection of spar tube retention bolt holes for 'elongation, corrosion, burrs, pitting or fretting' and associated repair procedures, but does not contain any instructions to inspect or repair bolt holes in the control rotor cuff for those same conditions.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record.