Piper PA-32R-301 N411JL

Summary

On 18 August 2000 at about 19:30 local time, a Piper PA-32R-301 registered N411JL was involved in an accident near Kennebunkport, Maine, United States. 5 people were on board and 2 died, one was seriously injured, 2 had minor injuries. The aircraft was substantially damaged. The NTSB has published a probable cause for this accident; it is quoted in full below.

Date

18 August 2000 at 19:30

Classification

Accident

Location

Kennebunkport, Maine, United States

Coordinates

44.6940, -69.3821

Aircraft

Piper PA-32R-301

Registration

N411JL

Category

Airplane

Engines

1

Operator

Not recorded

Operating rule

Part 91: General Aviation

Purpose of flight

Personal

Phase of flight

Not recorded

Route

Portsmouth → Liverpool

Aircraft damage

Substantial

Weather

VMC

Light

Day

NTSB number

IAD00FA076

2 people died.

Fracture of the #4 connecting rod for undetermined reasons, which resulted in a loss of engine power. A factor was the forced ocean ditching.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record. This site does not paraphrase or interpret it.

Read the full NTSB narrative

The airplane was in cruise flight at 9,000 feet over the ocean when a loud bang was heard from the engine compartment and the windshield was covered with oil. The pilot said that the engine produced partial power before the engine and propeller stopped. The pilot ditched the airplane in the ocean. Examination of the wreckage revealed there was an 8-inch by 5-inch hole in the top of the engine case. The camshaft was exposed and completely fractured aft of the #3 intake lobe. The #4 connecting rod was fractured about mid point. The upper half of the connecting rod was attached to the piston pin, and the piston was staked in the cylinder. The lower half of the #4 connecting rod and its corresponding bearing cap were not attached to the crankshaft, and were not recovered. The #2 and #6 connecting rods displayed heat damage, while the #4 did not. Metallurgical examination of the recovered portions of the #4 connecting rod revealed failure modes consistent with overstress, but no evidence of a primary failure mode was evident on the recovered components. Examination of the engine maintenance records revealed that the #2 cylinder was removed, repaired, and re-installed 1,020 flight hours prior to the accident.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record.