McDonnell Douglas DC-8-71F N8076U

Summary

On 26 April 2001 at about 11:29 local time, a McDonnell Douglas DC-8-71F registered N8076U, operated by Emery Worldwide Airlines, Inc., was involved in an incident near Nashville, Tennessee, United States. 3 people were on board and nobody was injured. The aircraft was slightly damaged. The NTSB has published a probable cause for this accident; it is quoted in full below.

Date

26 April 2001 at 11:29

Classification

Incident

Location

Nashville, Tennessee, United States

Nearest airport

Nashville International (BNA)

Coordinates

36.1102, -86.6602

Aircraft

McDonnell Douglas DC-8-71F

Registration

N8076U

Category

Airplane

Engines

4

Operator

Emery Worldwide Airlines, Inc.

Operating rule

Part 121: Air Carrier

Phase of flight

Not recorded

Route

Dayton → Nashville

Aircraft damage

Minor

Weather

VMC

Light

Day

NTSB number

MIA01IA129

Nobody was injured.

The failure of company maintenance personnel to install the correct hydraulic landing gear extension component, and the failure of company maintenance inspection personnel to comply with proper post maintenance test procedures, resulting in the impossibility of the LMLG to extend, and the subsequent LMLG up landing. A factor in the accident was the improper identification tag marking on the replacement component, and no marking on the component, itself.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record. This site does not paraphrase or interpret it.

Read the full NTSB narrative

According to the pilot, the freighter flight was normal in all aspects until the landing gear were extended for landing at destination. The left main landing gear, (LMLG) indicated "unsafe", and all attempts, using the emergency/abnormal checklists and telephone/radio-relayed communications with company maintenance, failed to extend it. An emergency, LMLG retracted landing was performed with minimal damage to the aircraft. Postcrash investigation revealed that company maintenance installed a one-way check valve in the LMLG extend hydraulic lines instead of a restricted flow valve. The wrongly installed valve had no factory specification or part number attached, and the tag reportedly removed from it at installation possessed the wrong factory specification number, and the correct vendor' s part number. The company maintenance manual states that upon completion of the valve installation, a leak and operational test of the MLG retract/extension system be performed. The valve installation mechanic and the company inspector both stated that the finished job was leak and "ops" tested.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record.