De Havilland DHC-8-102 N822PH

Summary

On 6 March 2001 at about 15:40 local time, a De Havilland DHC-8-102 registered N822PH, operated by Horizon Air Industries, Inc., was involved in an accident near Portland, Oregon, United States. 33 people were on board and nobody was injured. The aircraft was substantially damaged. The NTSB has published a probable cause for this accident; it is quoted in full below.

Date

6 March 2001 at 15:40

Classification

Accident

Location

Portland, Oregon, United States

Nearest airport

Portland International (KPDX)

Coordinates

45.5697, -122.5895

Aircraft

De Havilland DHC-8-102

Registration

N822PH

Category

Airplane

Engines

2

Operator

Horizon Air Industries, Inc.

Operating rule

Part 121: Air Carrier

Phase of flight

Not recorded

Route

Seattle → Portland

Aircraft damage

Substantial

Weather

VMC

Light

Day

NTSB number

SEA01FA059

Nobody was injured.

The failure of the number 5 engine bearing assembly followed by the disconnection of the P2.5/P3 switching valve to rear inlet case sealing air tube and the melting of the NL probe port (sealing tube) which allowed an oil fed fire beyond the constraints of the engine casing and into the engine nacelle. A contributing factor was the company's failure to follow several maintenance procedures within the maintenance manual after a previous oil loss event. A second factor was the omission of the PW120A engine from the airworthiness directive issued by the FAA which mandated the completion of Pratt & Whitney service bulletin 20914. The lack of inclusion of the PW120A engine in the AD resulted in the company’s correct interpretation that the service bulletin was not mandatory.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record. This site does not paraphrase or interpret it.

Read the full NTSB narrative

Horizon Air flight 2325, a de Havilland DHC-8-102, on a scheduled 14CFR121 flight sustained an engine fire in a Pratt & Whitney (P&W) PW120A engine while on approach to Portland International airport, Portland, Oregon. An engine examination and teardown determined that the #5 bearing assembly had failed. Additional examination ascertained that the P2.5/P3 switching valve to rear inlet case sealing air tube had become disconnected, and the NL probe port sealing tube had melted, allowing an oil fed fire outside of the engine casing and into the engine compartment. Investigation determined that the engine had not been placed on oil consumption and daily chip detector examination by company maintenance as required by the engine maintenance manual following a loss of oil event approximately 180 hours previous to the fire. Additionally, the mandatory implementation of P&W service bulletin 20914, which addressed the P2.5/P3 switching valve to rear inlet case sealing air tube and NL probe port sealing tube was not carried out by the company, nor was it required, as the FAA airworthiness directive making the service bulletin mandatory did not include the PW120A engine. The investigation also revealed that the company mandated implementation of P&W service bulletin 21446R3, was not carried out during an earlier hot section inspection and immediately preceding the earlier oil loss event.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record.