Bartle LANCAIR IV-P N811HB

Summary

On 26 February 2008 at about 21:15 local time, a Bartle LANCAIR IV-P registered N811HB, operated by Henry Bartle Trustee, was involved in an accident near Murrieta/Temecu, California, United States. 4 people were on board and 3 were seriously injured. The aircraft was substantially damaged. The NTSB has published a probable cause for this accident; it is quoted in full below.

Date

26 February 2008 at 21:15

Classification

Accident

Location

Murrieta/Temecu, California, United States

Nearest airport

French Valley Airport (F70)

Coordinates

36.1160, -119.6812

Aircraft

Bartle LANCAIR IV-P

Registration

N811HB

Category

Airplane

Engines

1

Operator

Henry Bartle Trustee

Operating rule

Part 91: General Aviation

Purpose of flight

Personal

Phase of flight

Not recorded

Route

Murrieta/Temecu → Murrieta/Temecu

Aircraft damage

Substantial

Weather

VMC

Light

Day

NTSB number

LAX08LA066

3 people were seriously injured.

A total loss of engine power while on approach due to the electrical overload of a fuse caused by the builder's inadequate design and installation of the electrical ignition system.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record. This site does not paraphrase or interpret it.

Read the full NTSB narrative

The pilot reported that the engine lost power while on approach for landing in the amateur-built experimental airplane. Unable to reach the airport, the pilot initiated a forced landing in hilly desert terrain resulting in structural damage to the airframe. Inspection of the modified engine revealed that it was equipped with an electronic ignition system consisting of two capacitive discharge modules with direct crank sensors. Two five-amp fuses in the electrical circuit for the ignition system were found blown. Inspection of the electrical system found no failures of the physical airplane wiring. The pilot, who built the airplane, stated that he designed the ignition system's electrical circuit with the intention of providing electrical redundancy to the ignition system. Examination and testing of the design as installed demonstrated that a minor voltage differential between the main and redundant power source created a condition that routed the current flow for both ignition sources through a single fuse, resulting in a single point of failure. According to the ignition manufacturer, the recommended wiring configuration that would allow ignition power redundancy did not include the addition of a common bus bar as was found on the accident airplane. The positioning of the automotive fuses on the firewall prevented the pilot from accurately identifying the electrical failure.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record.