Maule M-5-180C N66VJ

Summary

On 22 April 2009 at about 17:00 local time, a Maule M-5-180C registered N66VJ was involved in an accident near Moultrie, Georgia, United States. 3 people were on board and nobody was injured. The aircraft was substantially damaged. The NTSB has published a probable cause for this accident; it is quoted in full below.

Date

22 April 2009 at 17:00

Classification

Accident

Location

Moultrie, Georgia, United States

Nearest airport

Spence Field (MUL)

Coordinates

31.1378, -83.7039

Aircraft

Maule M-5-180C

Registration

N66VJ

Category

Airplane

Engines

1

Operator

Not recorded

Operating rule

Part 91: General Aviation

Purpose of flight

Personal

Phase of flight

Not recorded

Route

Moultrie → Moultrie

Aircraft damage

Substantial

Light

Day

NTSB number

ERA09LA257

Nobody was injured.

A loss of engine power due to carburetor icing as a result of the maintenance technician's failure to detect and correct the condition of the carburetor heat duct.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record. This site does not paraphrase or interpret it.

Read the full NTSB narrative

The airplane was flown from Texas to Georgia, with an intermediate fuel stop in Mississippi. After landing at an airport in Georgia, the pilot/owner realized that his destination was situated on a different airport, located about 6 miles away. The pilot stated that he departed for the other airport, and when the airplane was at an altitude of approximately 1,500 feet above mean sea level, and 2 miles from the second airport, the engine "quit running." Attempts to restart the engine were unsuccessful, and the pilot conducted a forced landing to a field, which resulted in substantial damage to the airplane. Post-accident examination revealed that the airplane had sufficient fuel, and was configured properly for flight. The engine was successfully started and run with no problems. A detailed examination of the engine compartment revealed that the carburetor heat duct, which consisted of a material typically referred to as "scat tubing," was split around most of its circumference. Maintenance records indicated that an annual inspection was completed 4 days prior to the accident. The records indicated that the duct was installed on the airplane at least 8 years prior to the accident, and may have been installed 19 years prior to the accident. A representative of a manufacturer of aircraft scat tubing stated that the company considered the material to have a "shelf life" of 20 years.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record.