Diamond DA20-C1 N978CT

Summary

On 17 November 2010 at about 20:06 local time, a Diamond DA20-C1 registered N978CT, operated by Utah Valley University, was involved in an accident near Payson, Utah, United States. 2 people were on board and 2 died. The aircraft was substantially damaged. The NTSB has published a probable cause for this accident; it is quoted in full below.

Date

17 November 2010 at 20:06

Classification

Accident

Location

Payson, Utah, United States

Nearest airport

Provo (KPVU)

Coordinates

40.0375, -111.7397

Aircraft

Diamond DA20-C1

Registration

N978CT

Category

Airplane

Engines

1

Operator

Utah Valley University

Operating rule

Part 91: General Aviation

Purpose of flight

Instructional

Phase of flight

Not recorded

Route

Provo Municipal → Provo Municipal

Aircraft damage

Substantial

Weather

VMC

Light

Day

NTSB number

WPR11FA050

2 people died.

The pilots' failure to maintain adequate airspeed during a slow flight maneuver that resulted in a stall and spin, and the flight instructor’s delayed or improper remedial actions to recover from the spin. Contributing to the accident was the flight school’s inadequate safety program.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record. This site does not paraphrase or interpret it.

Read the full NTSB narrative

During the dual instructional flight, the airplane entered a spin and made numerous descending rotations before impacting at a 44-degree nose down angle onto a residential driveway. Sounds consistent with engine operation during the descent were reported by witnesses. The aircraft wreckage was located directly under a designated practice area. The floor of the practice area was 2,500 feet above ground level (agl) and the upper altitude limit was 5,500 feet agl. According to the flight school director of operations, typical work done in the high-altitude working areas included stalls, slow flight, and steep turns. Examination of the airplane wreckage revealed that the flaps were in-between the takeoff and landing position; flap deployment is consistent with slow flight or stall practice. The intention of the instructional flight was to prepare the student for his private pilot practical examination. According to records maintained by the flight school, a majority of the student pilot's flights had been with the accident instructor; however, the certified flight instructor (CFI) provided extremely little documentation on the actual performance of the student during the flight portion of his training. A similar stall and spin event occurred 2 weeks prior to the accident where the same CFI and a different student lost control of the airplane during a slow flight practice; however, in that instance, the CFI was able to recover the airplane quickly. The CFI's most recent spin training was conducted 7 years prior to the accident, although the flight school required instructors to complete a flight check every 12 months for each course of training they were approved to teach. The flight school that operated the training flight did not have a functional mechanism to track safety incidents or a well advertised way for the students or staff to anonymously report aviation safety concerns. The director of safety did not convene regular safety meetings. Flight school management did not require CFIs to create written commentary regarding each student’s performance. There was a perception by three of the four chief flight instructors that CFI proficiency flights were not encouraged, and the CFIs were discouraged from using company flight time to maintain proficiency.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record.