Beechcraft C23 N180ED

Summary

On 25 February 2010 at about 14:27 local time, a Beechcraft C23 registered N180ED, operated by Tailwheels ETC, Inc., was involved in an accident near Winter Haven, Florida, United States. 2 people were on board and 2 died. The aircraft was substantially damaged. The NTSB has published a probable cause for this accident; it is quoted in full below.

Date

25 February 2010 at 14:27

Classification

Accident

Location

Winter Haven, Florida, United States

Nearest airport

Winter Haven's Gilbert Airport (GIF)

Coordinates

28.0653, -81.7628

Aircraft

Beechcraft C23

Registration

N180ED

Category

Airplane

Engines

1

Operator

Tailwheels ETC, Inc.

Operating rule

Part 91: General Aviation

Purpose of flight

Personal

Phase of flight

Not recorded

Route

Winter Haven → Lakeland

Aircraft damage

Substantial

Weather

VMC

Light

Day

NTSB number

ERA10FA150

2 people died.

The pilot’s improper placement of the fuel selector valve during takeoff, and his failure to maintain adequate airspeed following a total loss of engine power resulting in an inadvertent stall. Contributing to the accident was the failure of maintenance personnel to detect the lack of proper markings on the fuel selector stop and fuel selector valve shroud at the last 100-Hour inspection.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record. This site does not paraphrase or interpret it.

Read the full NTSB narrative

During the initial climb after takeoff, the engine lost power, and the airplane stalled and impacted the ground. A postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no mechanical malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation. The fuel selector was observed in the off range after the accident and immediate postaccident testing of the selector valve revealed no mechanical anomalies. While the pilot’s cockpit actions pertaining to the fuel selector valve following the loss of engine power could not be determined, the lack of a preimpact mechanical failure of the engine or its systems, and the lack of an issue related to fuel quality are consistent with the fuel selector valve being in the off range for takeoff. Inspection and operational testing of the fuel selector valve was reportedly performed as required during the last annual and 100-Hour inspections; however, no guidance was given to maintenance personnel on how to perform the operational shutdown test. Different interpretations of what constituted proper engine shutdown was noted by the mechanics that performed the last annual and 100-Hour inspections. The mechanic who performed the last 100-Hour inspection approximately 6 months prior to the accident failed to detect that the fuel selector valve guard and stop did not contain required markings which clearly depict the off range for the pilot.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record.