Beechcraft A23 N3542R

Summary

On 13 June 2013 at about 14:10 local time, a Beechcraft A23 registered N3542R, operated by Wehe Albert H, was involved in an accident near Oxford, North Carolina, United States. 2 people were on board and 2 had minor injuries. The aircraft was substantially damaged. The NTSB has published a probable cause for this accident; it is quoted in full below.

Date

13 June 2013 at 14:10

Classification

Accident

Location

Oxford, North Carolina, United States

Nearest airport

Henderson-Oxford Airport (HNZ)

Coordinates

36.3617, -78.5292

Aircraft

Beechcraft A23

Registration

N3542R

Category

Airplane

Year built

1965

Engines

1

Operator

Wehe Albert H

Operating rule

Part 91: General Aviation

Purpose of flight

Personal

Phase of flight

Not recorded

Route

Oxford → Oxford

Aircraft damage

Substantial

Weather

VMC

Light

Day

NTSB number

ERA13LA285

2 people had minor injuries.

The failure to comply with an airworthiness directive by maintenance personnel and incorrect reinstallation of the fuel selector handle by unknown personnel, which resulted in fuel starvation.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record. This site does not paraphrase or interpret it.

Read the full NTSB narrative

During the preflight inspection, the pilot/owner observed about 20 gallons of fuel in the left main fuel tank and significantly less fuel in the right main fuel tank. The pilot departed on a brief local flight with the fuel selector handle positioned to the left main fuel tank. About 10 minutes into the flight, the engine lost all power, and the flight instructor-rated passenger performed a forced landing to a field. During the landing, the airplane impacted a berm and sustained substantial damage to the left wing and fuselage. Examination of the wreckage revealed that the airplane's fuel selector handle was installed 180 degrees from its correct orientation. As such, when the handle portion of the selector was pointing at the desired tank, the pointer (arrow) was pointing in the opposite direction. Thus, when the pilot selected the left main fuel tank, the fuel selector valve was actually positioned to the right main fuel tank, which had little fuel at takeoff and was found empty after the accident. Additionally, the fuel selector handle was missing its roll pin, which allowed it to be installed incorrectly. Due to the fuel system design of return fuel going to the left main fuel tank only, the pilot primarily flew with the fuel selector positioned to the left main fuel tank. The fuel selector handle was often removed and reinstalled during maintenance inspections to allow access to the floor boards in the cockpit. An airworthiness directive (AD) for the fuel valve required repetitive inspection of the roll pin fuel valve during annual inspections per a manufacturer service instruction, or replacement of the roll pin valve with a D-handle type valve. Review of maintenance records revealed that about 38 years prior to the accident, a logbook entry indicated that the AD was complied with by installing a D-handle fuel valve; however, a roll pin type valve was installed at the time of the accident. Maintenance personnel performing subsequent inspections would assume, per the logbook entry, that the D-handle valve had been installed and any maintenance reference to the roll pin valve would not be applicable. The mechanic that performed the most recent annual inspection stated that he was not aware of a roll pin. The mechanic added that during the annual inspection, he removed and replaced the fuel selector handle to the same position he had found it. The pilot had owned the airplane for about 45 years and also performed some maintenance on it himself. The investigation could not determine when during the airplane's history that the fuel selector handle was installed incorrectly or by whom.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record.