Hawker 400 XA-MEX

Summary

On 23 December 2015 at about 21:15 local time, a Hawker 400 registered XA-MEX, operated by Aerolineas Ejecutivas S A De CV, was involved in an accident near Telluride, Colorado, United States. 7 people were on board and nobody was injured. The aircraft was substantially damaged. The NTSB has published a probable cause for this accident; it is quoted in full below.

Date

23 December 2015 at 21:15

Classification

Accident

Location

Telluride, Colorado, United States

Nearest airport

Telluride (KTEX)

Coordinates

37.9533, -107.9094

Aircraft

Hawker 400

Registration

XA-MEX

Category

Airplane

Operator

Aerolineas Ejecutivas S A De CV

Operating rule

Part 129: Foreign

Phase of flight

Not recorded

Route

El Paso → Telluride

Aircraft damage

Substantial

Weather

IMC

Light

Day

NTSB number

CEN16LA067

Nobody was injured.

The limitations of the air traffic control equipment that prevented the controller's timely recognition of NOTAM information that was effective immediately and resulted in the issuance of an approach clearance to a closed runway. Also causal was the pilots' omission to monitor and transmit their intentions on the airport common frequency. Contributing to the accident was the controller's heavy workload and the limitations of the NOTAM system to distribute information in a timely manner.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record. This site does not paraphrase or interpret it.

Read the full NTSB narrative

The pilots were conducting an international chartered flight in the small, twin-engine jet with five passengers onboard.  Since the weather at the destination was marginal, the flight crew had discussed an alternate airport in case weather conditions required a missed approach at their destination. As the airplane neared the non-towered destination airport, the flight crew received updated weather information, which indicated that conditions had improved. Upon contacting the center controller, the crew was asked if they had the weather and NOTAMS for the destination airport. The crew reported that they received the current weather information, but did not state if they had NOTAM information. The controller responded by giving the flight a heading for the descent and sequence into the airport. The controller did not provide NOTAM information to the pilots. About 2 minutes later, airport personnel entered a NOTAM via computer closing the runway, effective immediately, for snow removal.  Although the NOTAM was electronically routed to the controller, the controller's system was not designed to automatically alert the controller of a new NOTAM; the controller needed to select a display screen on the equipment that contained the information. At the time of the accident, the controller's workload was considered heavy. About 8 minutes after the runway closure NOTAM was issued, the controller cleared the airplane for the approach. The flight crew then canceled their instrument flight plan with the airport in sight, but did not subsequently transmit on or monitor the airport's common traffic advisory frequency, which was reportedly being monitored by airport personnel and the snow removal equipment operator.  The airplane landed on the runway and collided with a snow removal vehicle about halfway down the runway.  The flight crew reported they did not see the snow removal equipment. The accident scenario is consistent with the controllers not recognizing new NOTAM information in a timely manner due to equipment limitations, and the pilots not transmitting or monitoring the common traffic advisory frequency.  Additionally, the accident identifies a potential problem for flight crews when information critical to inflight decision-making changes while en route, and problems when controller workload interferes with information monitoring and dissemination.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record.