Airbus BD-500-1A11 (CS300) HB-JCC

Summary

On 15 October 2019 at about 06:40 local time, a Airbus BD-500-1A11 (CS300) registered HB-JCC, operated by Swiss International Air Lines Ltd., was involved in an incident near West Flanders Province, Belgium. The number of people on board was not recorded. The aircraft was slightly damaged. The NTSB has published a probable cause for this accident; it is quoted in full below.

Date

15 October 2019 at 06:40

Classification

Incident

Location

West Flanders Province, Belgium

Coordinates

50.9934, 2.7952

Aircraft

Airbus BD-500-1A11 (CS300)

Registration

HB-JCC

Category

Airplane

Year built

2017

Engines

2

Operator

Swiss International Air Lines Ltd.

Operating rule

Non-U.S., Commercial

Phase of flight

Not recorded

Route

London → Geneva

Aircraft damage

Minor

Weather

Unk

Light

Dawn

NTSB number

ENG20LA001

Injuries not recorded.

A No. 1 (left) engine low pressure compressor (LPC) stage 1 integrally bladed rotor (IBR) separation due to a high cycle fatigue crack (HCF) that originated at the runout of an airfoil leading edge root radius. The HCF crack developed because of a mechanically coupled LPC stage 3 and stage 1 IBR mode excitation and blade flutter response. The excitation was driven by an acoustic tone generated by turbulent airflow passing over the 2.5 bleed valve duct cavity while the engine was operating at high speeds in specific flight conditions. A primary contributor to the failure mode was an electronic engine control (EEC) software update that changed the LPC vane schedule and increased the likelihood of LPC stage 1 IBR blade flutter onset within the engine operating range.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record. This site does not paraphrase or interpret it.

Read the full NTSB narrative

The No. 1 engine low pressure compressor (LPC) stage 1 integrally bladed rotor (IBR) failure was caused by a stage 1 IBR high cycle fatigue crack that originated at the runout of an airfoil leading edge root radius. Multiple analytical methods, including two-dimensional (2D) computational fluid dynamics (CFD), acoustic testing, and instrumented flight testing identified a coupled LPC stage 3 and stage 1 IBR instability caused by an acoustic coincidence with the 2.5 bleed valve duct cavity. At high engine N1 speeds, the stage 3 IBR blade tips generate vortices/turbulent airflow and given the right conditions, the turbulent airflow can create an acoustic tone as it passes over the 2.5 bleed valve duct cavity, located immediately aft of the LPC stage 3 IBR (Figure 1). The acoustic tone drove a LPC stage 3 IBR blade 1st bending mode excitation that was then mechanically transferred through the LPC module and excited a LPC stage 1 IBR stiffwise bending mode that was present at the same approximate frequency. The resultant stresses on the LPC stage 1 IBR blades exceeded material limits and subsequently led to crack formation and eventual progression to overload failure. Figure 1- Engine LPC Diagram Identifying the IBR 3 / 2.5 Bleed Valve Acoustic Interaction Factors that contributed to the LPC stage 3 and stage 1 IBR acoustic coincidence and blade excitation within the engine operating range were: installation of electronic engine control (EEC) Software V2.11.7.2 and the low time rub in period on the LPC IBR blade tip clearances. EEC Software V2.11.7.2 changed the LPC inlet guide vane schedule to rotate the IGV’s in the closed direction at specific high power engine conditions to improve engine stall/surge margin. The revised vane schedule inadvertently created conditions that were favorable for generation of the 2.5 bleed valve duct cavity acoustic tone and IBR mode excitation. New engines have tighter clearances between the LPC IBR blade tips and the outer air seals. The reduced clearance created unsteady loading at the blade tip region and resulted in stronger acoustic coupling/flutter response. After a rub in period, the clearance increases, and the occurrence of flutter onset is reduced. There were three PW1524G-3 and one PW1521G-3 LPC stage 1 IBR separation events between July 25, 2019 and February 12, 2020 that occurred on multiple operators. The incident detailed in this investigation was the third PW1500G series LPC stage 1 IBR failure. The engine parameters at the time of each of the events and the resulting engine damage were consistent. Additional information about the failure mode and investigation process are available in the investigation dockets for the first two incidents, NTSB investigation numbers ENG19IA029 and ENG19IA034.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record.