Piper PA22 N6804B

Summary

On 7 June 2025 at about 17:09 local time, a Piper PA22 registered N6804B was involved in an accident near Hebron, Ohio, United States. 2 people were on board and nobody was injured. The aircraft was substantially damaged. The NTSB has published a probable cause for this accident; it is quoted in full below.

Date

7 June 2025 at 17:09

Classification

Accident

Location

Hebron, Ohio, United States

Nearest airport

Buckeye (9OA5)

Coordinates

39.9580, -82.5409

Aircraft

Piper PA22

Registration

N6804B

Category

Airplane

Year built

1956

Engines

1

Operator

Not recorded

Operating rule

Part 91: General Aviation

Purpose of flight

Personal

Phase of flight

Not recorded

Route

Unknown → Lancaster

Aircraft damage

Substantial

Weather

VMC

Light

Day

NTSB number

ERA25LA223

Nobody was injured.

The airplane owner and pilot’s intentional allowance of unapproved maintenance and maintenance personnel’s failure to adequately maintain or service the brake system, which resulted in a total loss of brake pressure.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record. This site does not paraphrase or interpret it.

Read the full NTSB narrative

The pilot reported that the brakes functioned normally during taxi, and pretakeoff checks, with no anomalies noted. The flight was uneventful, and he entered the traffic pattern at his destination airport. After touchdown, he retracted the flaps, reduced engine power, and applied the brakes, and the airplane initially decelerated as expected. With about one-third of the runway remaining, total brake pressure was lost. He determined that insufficient runway remained to execute a go-around, so he elected to perform “S” turns in an attempt to slow the airplane. As the airplane approached the end of the runway, he applied right rudder to avoid a runway overrun. During the ensuing turn, the left wing impacted the ground, which resulted in substantial damage to the wing. The mechanic who completed the most recent annual inspection of the airplane reported that, 10 days before the accident, he had installed a new brake booster in accordance with a supplemental type certificate (STC). The STC kit did not include the required “screw-vent”, so the mechanic temporarily installed a brake bleeder valve and instructed the owner not to fly the airplane before the correct screw-vent was installed. The brakes were bled multiple times, operationally checked, the maintenance logbook was signed, and the airplane was returned to service. The pilot reported that, 5 days before the accident, the brakes were inoperative due to a lack of pressure during an attempted taxi. He stated that a local mechanic sanded the brake caliper and replaced the Orings/packing; however, no maintenance logbook entry was made, and the mechanic denied performing the work. The mechanic did report that he had examined the airplane, provided advice to the pilot, and observed several discrepancies, including a missing screw vent. Following the reported maintenance, the pilot stated that an operational check of the brakes was conducted with no anomalies noted. Postaccident examination of the brake system by an FAA airworthiness inspector revealed a significant amount of air in the system and no brake pressure. After the brakes were bled and an operational check was conducted, brake engagement did not occur until the final 10% of brake handle travel, and full brake effectiveness was not achieved. The examination also identified the presence of an unapproved part and incomplete compliance with the supplemental type certificate. Additionally, evidence indicated that undocumented maintenance had been performed following installation of the STC. Due to either an unapproved part, undocumented maintenance, and incomplete compliance with the STC, it is likely that the air in the brake system was a result of inadequate maintenance.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record.