Sabian RANS S-12XL N725ST

Summary

On 22 September 2002 at about 21:30 local time, a Sabian RANS S-12XL registered N725ST was involved in an accident near Mexican Hat, Utah, United States. 2 people were on board and 2 died. The aircraft was destroyed. The NTSB has published a probable cause for this accident; it is quoted in full below.

Date

22 September 2002 at 21:30

Classification

Accident

Location

Mexican Hat, Utah, United States

Coordinates

37.3219, -109.9553

Aircraft

Sabian RANS S-12XL

Registration

N725ST

Category

Airplane

Engines

1

Operator

Not recorded

Operating rule

Part 91: General Aviation

Purpose of flight

Personal

Phase of flight

Not recorded

Route

Blanding → Durango

Aircraft damage

Destroyed

Weather

VMC

Light

Day

NTSB number

DEN02LA109

2 people died.

the pilot's inadequate in-flight planning and decision making (flying up a canyon with insufficient altitude) which resulted in an inadvertent stall/mush, and the pilot's failure to follow the proper emergency procedures for activating his Ballistic Recovery System (shutting off his pusher engine before deploying the BRS parachute). Contributing factors were the improper installation of the BRS by the pilot which led to the subsequent severing of the parachute line by his propeller during deployment.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record. This site does not paraphrase or interpret it.

Read the full NTSB narrative

The pilot flew up the canyon, looking for a campsite for a future trip. Witnesses observed the aircraft make a "tight" U-turn in the canyon, and then deploy a parachute. The parachute separated from the airplane, and the airplane free fell, impacting the terrain. Witnesses heard the engine running, all the way to impact. A postimpact fire consumed the airplane. The Ballistic Recovery System (BRS), installed on this airplane was a BRS VLS (Vertical Launch System) 1200 model. The system contained a warning label that states "Aircraft Engine Must Be Shut Off Prior to Deploying Parachute. Failure to Do So May Result in Death or Serious Injury." The BRS unit was shipped to the pilot on August 9, 2002; he performed the installation. An examination of the airplane showed the two carabineers next to each other in the airplane wreckage. If the BRS system had been assembled properly, they should have been approximately 10 feet apart. The 14 foot 11-3/4 inch riser was found cut at one end. The other end was still attached to the suspension lines of the parachute. Approximately 4 feet of the riser was consumed by fire. The physical evidence revealed that the protective Kevlar bridle (resistant to propeller slashes) had been inadvertently removed from the BRS system during installation.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record.