Piper PA-34-200T N633TC

Summary

On 3 June 2013 at about 19:20 local time, a Piper PA-34-200T registered N633TC, operated by Florida Flight Training Center, was involved in an incident near Tallahassee, Florida, United States. 2 people were on board and nobody was injured. The NTSB has published a probable cause for this accident; it is quoted in full below.

Date

3 June 2013 at 19:20

Classification

Incident

Location

Tallahassee, Florida, United States

Nearest airport

Tallahassee (TLH)

Coordinates

30.3969, -84.3508

Aircraft

Piper PA-34-200T

Registration

N633TC

Category

Airplane

Engines

2

Operator

Florida Flight Training Center

Operating rule

Part 91: General Aviation

Purpose of flight

Instructional

Phase of flight

Not recorded

Route

Tallahassee → Venice

Aircraft damage

Not recorded

Weather

VMC

Light

Day

NTSB number

ERA13IA267

Nobody was injured.

The failure of the elevator trim cable due to fatigue cracking, which resulted from maintenance personnel’s repeated inadequate inspection of the cable.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record. This site does not paraphrase or interpret it.

Read the full NTSB narrative

According to the flight instructor, during the initial climb, the student pilot noticed a problem with the elevator trim wheel. The flight instructor moved the trim wheel and noted no resistance. He then looked down at the wheel and observed the trim cable protruding from its side. The flight instructor assumed control of the airplane, advised the tower air traffic controller of the emergency, and landed the airplane without incident. Examination of the elevator trim cable assembly revealed that the trim cable failed due to fatigue cracking of the individual wires. The wire breaks were so numerous and over such a sizable length that they should have been detectable by a visual inspection. However, a review of the aircraft logbooks revealed that maintenance personnel did not detect the fatigue cracking of the wires during the most recent 100-hour and annual inspections nor during compliance with an airworthiness directive (AD) that required, in part, that all control cables be inspected for broken wires strands and that any broken wire strands be replaced; the inspections and AD were accomplished less than 2 months before the incident.

Quoted verbatim from the NTSB record.